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Judicial Misconduct: A View from the
Department of Justice*
By REiD H. WEINGARTEN**
INTRODUCTION
Few events cause more concern in the Department of Justice
than the receipt of a credible allegation of serious wrongdoing
by a sitting federal judge. The investigation of such an allegation
can be controversial, can disrupt proceedings in the judge's
district, and can cause difficulties between the Department and
the bench. Nevertheless, the Justice Department firmly takes the
position that these allegations must be pursued vigorously and
thoroughly to ensure the integrity of the federal bench. By
internal, admimstrative rule, all such allegations that the De-
partment receives are directed to the Public.Integrity Section of
the Criminal Division. As a member of the Public Integrity
Section from 1977 to 1987, my assignment was to supervise
several investigations of federal judges, including two which
resulted in prosecutions.' My purpose is to describe the Depart-
ment's role in these matters, from the investigative stage through
the decision to prosecute and through trial. Finally, I will have
a few comments on the Department's role in enforcement of the
Judicial Disability Act of 19802 and its involvement in the im-
peachment process.
* Adapted from a speech at the Symposium on Judicial Discipline and Impeach-
ment, sponsored by the Kentucky Law Journal on October 12, 1987. All views expressed
are the author's and do not represent the official policy of the Department of Justice.
** Of Counsel, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C., Trial Attorney (1977-87),
Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. B.S., Cornell
Umversity, 1971; J.D., Dickinson School of Law, 1975.
1 The prosecutions were of Judge Alcee Hastings of the Southern District of
Florida and Judge Walter Nixon of the Southern District of Mississippi. Hastings was
acquitted in 1983, and Nixon was convicted in 1986.
2 The Act is formally known as the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-332, 372, 604 (1982)).
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I. TH INVESTIGATrW STAGE
Most of the allegations against federal judges are made by
prisoners who are unhappy with their sentences and seek to
"trade" information with the government, or by disgruntled
litigants who are convinced that "the fix" had to be in for the
judge to have ruled against them. An extremely high percentage
of these allegations are completely meritless and easily disproved.
Indeed, the Public Integrity Section routinely and quietly closes
the investigation and declines prosecution in numerous such
allegations after an interview of the person making the allegation
and a review of appropriate court documents. These cases rarely
make the news, require a referral under the Judicial Disability
Act, 3 or even come to the attention of the judge against whom
the allegation is made.
When the Public Integrity Section determines that an alle-
gation could -have some merit, the Department has various in-
vestigative techniques available, including FBI interviews, use of
the grand jury, search warrants, undercover operations, and
electronic surveillance. Unusual problems arise with some of
these techniques, however, when the subject of the investigation
is a federal judge.
A. Getting Inside the Chambers
When investigating allegations of judicial corruption, the
government frequently seeks to interview and to receive docu-
ments from individuals who work for a federal judge, including
law clerks, secretaries, members of the clerk of court's office,
bailiffs, and marshals. Crucial to the resolution of an allegation
may be a determination of why the judge issued an order on a
given day, why he ruled in favor of a particular party, or with
whom he discussed a particular case. Efforts to receive such
evidence may run afoul of a privilege protecting confidential
communications among judges and their staffs in the perform-
ance of judicial duties. A court first applied this privilege in In
re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating
See Id.
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Committee of Judicial Council of Eleventh Circui. 4 In this case,
Judge Hastings challenged the Eleventh Circiit Ifivestigatinig
Committee subpoenas to his staff and thereby called into ques-
tion the existence, applicability, and scope of a privilege pro-
tecting "against disclosure of confidential communications ariong
an Article III judge and members of is staff regarding the
performance of his judicial duties.' '5 The special panel assigned
to hear this case found a need for a judicial privilege protecting
the confidentiality of judicial communications:
Judges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid dis-
course with their colleagues and staff to promote the effective
discharge of their duties. The judiciary, no less than the ex-
ecutive, is ,supreme within its own area of constitutionally
assigned duties. Confidentiality helps protect judges' independ-
ent reasoning from improper outside influences. It also safe-
guards legitimate privacy interests of judges and litigants.
6
The panel concluded, therefore, that a privilege protecting
confidential judicial communications exists. They found the priv-
ilege to be a qualified one, limited, "[iln the main .. to
communications among judges and others relating to official
judicial business such as, for example, the framing and research-
ing of opinions, orders, and rulings."' 7 Placing the burden on
the party asserting the privilege to demonstrate that the privilege
covers such matters, the panel held that the matters at issue-
appointment diaries, calendars, travel itineraries, sign-in sheets,
and telephone message books in Judge Hastings chambers-had
not been shown to be within the judicial privilege.8 The import
of this decision is that the government cannot penetrate the
confidential judicial decision-making process; however, it can
gain access to other evidence in chambers that is relevant to its
investigation.
783 F.2d 1488 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).
' Id. at 1518.
6 Id. at 1519-20.
Id. at 1520.
'Id.
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B. Wiretaps
The idea of a wiretap in a judge's chambers causes uneasy
feelings among lawyers in and out of the Justice Department.
Few would disagree that the government should not overhear
sensitive, privileged conversations between judges or between a
judge and his or her law clerk about how cases should be
decided. Nevertheless, it does not follow that electronic surveil-
lance in a judge's chambers is per se unreasonable and therefore
illegal. To the contrary, one can envision an extraordinary cir-
cumstance in which a well-placed, judicially ordered, carefully
supervised wiretap is the only investigative technique that will
allow the government to decide conclusively whether or not the
judge is involved m criminal wrongdoing.
Lawyers have argued frequently that wiretaps on their tele-
phones are per se unreasonable because the government secretly
may listen to privileged attorney-client conversations. Courts in
United States v Loften9 and United States v King'° have found
these arguments unpersuasive. Courts have held that title III,
the wiretap statute," creates a careful statutory scheme that fully
protects the confidentiality of privileged communications without
making criminal activity conducted in lawyers' offices or over
lawyers' telephones absolutely immune from electronic surveil-
lance.12
The primary protection set forth in the wiretap statute is the
requirement that a judge must authorize all interceptions of wire
or oral communications.' 3 Moreover, wiretap applications must
be designed to minimize the possible interception of "commu-
9 507 F Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court demed motion to suppress recorded
telephone conversations between attorney and defendant); 518 F Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (court demed motion to dismiss indictment), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987).
10 335 F Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 478 F.2d 494
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12 See, e.g., King, 335 F Supp. at 523. The government received authorization for
and utilized a wiretap in a lawyer's office in the Hastings prosecution. The lawyer, Bill
Borders, had telephone conversations with Hastings from his office which were recorded.
Borders was later indicted with Hastings and his challenge to the wiretap was demed.
Borders was convicted in a separate trial. See United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983).
13 18 U.S.C. at § 2518(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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mcations not otherwise subject to interception under this chap-
ter.'" 4 Also, to ensure strict adherence to the statutorily-mandated
minimization requirement, the statute provides for close judicial
supervision of the wiretap. 15 If a privileged communication were
intercepted in violation of a mlnmization order, then that com-
mumcation would properly be suppressed.16 Even privileged com-
mumcations intercepted inadvertently or in good faith would
nonetheless be inadrmssible at trial. 17
The same protections obviously would apply to commum-
cations intercepted in a judge's chambers, and a reviewing court
probably would conclude that such protections sufficiently shield
judges from unreasonable electronic surveillance. If a situation
ever arose in which the government had probable cause to believe
that specific criminal conversations would take place in chambers
or over a judge's telephone, one would expect the government
to seek and to receive authority for a wiretap. Also, one would
expect that carefully trained, experienced agents would momtor
the wiretap to minimize the possibility of either overhearing or
recording legitimate, confidential conversations.
C. Undercover Operations: What Can the Government Do
A defendant or his or her lawyer often report to the govern-
ment that the defendant has received word, usually from some
shadowy middleman, that, if he or she pays the judge a bribe,
usually through the middleman, he or she will be acquitted,
receive a light sentence, or receive some other benefit. The case
is typically underway when the middleman makes his approach,
usually with a key event, such as the trial or sentencing, in the
near future. What can the government do to test these allegations
without interfering with the case or with the defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel? May the
government provide the money to the defendant to pay the
14 Id. at § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
" Id. at § 2518(6) (1982); see United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
16 See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
,, 18 U.S.C. at § 2517(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
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middleman and then wait to see what happens? If the middleman
instructs, and the government encourages, the defendant to plead
guilty after the payment, does the defendant get his or her right
to trial back if the judge is deemed not to be corrupt? If the
defendant's attorney received the solicitation, may the govern-
ment deal with the attorney and require that the attorney keep
the client in the dark? Difficult questions abound in this area
with little guidance provided in the case law
The government's lawyer should take particular care if he or
she presents or encourages others to present false evidence to an
unknowing court for the purpose of developing evidence for a
subsequent prosecution. If the prosecutor encourages or permits
the defendant or his or her attorney to lie or to mislead the
court to induce the judge to incriminate himself or herself, he
or she may run afoul of the bar's ethical standards and be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
8
The Justice Department's policy m these cases is to advise
some judicial authority about the progress of the investigation.
Advising a judge on the same court as the judge under investi-
gation often will be awkward or unwise. In some instances, the
Justice Department has gone to the chief judge of the appellate
court which oversees the judge under investigation. Judicial su-
pervision helps ensure that the government takes no msstep
during the investigation and that timely judicial assistance is
available, for example, to issue a warrant or to grant an im-
mumty
II. THE CHARGING DECISION: VINDICTIVE PROSECUTIONS?
In the recent criminal trials of Judges Hastings, Claiborne
and Nixon, 19 all three judges argued that the government was
prosecuting them improperly because they had made rulings that
the Justice Department did not like. Indeed, behind the primary
argument that federal judges cannot be prosecuted, but only
impeached, is the notion that judges must be shielded from
11 See, e.g., In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (Il. 1979).
9 Judge Harry Claiborne of the District of Nevada was convicted in 1984. See
supra note 1.
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possible prosecution by a vindictive and angry Justice Depart-
ment.
My experience in the Justice Department causes me to believe
that it is extremely unlikely that a prosecution of a federal judge
could ever be triggered by an improper motive. Prior to approval
of the presentation of an indictment to a grand jury, the case is
meticulously and extensively reviewed at many levels, most of
them involving participation by experienced, career prosecutors
who analyze and challenge the case from every conceivable angle.
The prosecutor who proposes presenting the indictment must be
able to meet every challenge, or the case will not be brought.
At the same time, the judge under investigation is. given every
opportumty to provide the Department -with exculpatory evi-
dence, mitigating circumstances, or reasons not to indict. In my
experience, the process is fair and thorough, with the Depart-
ment having no institutional bias whatsoever in favor of prose-
cution. Of course, after indictment, the defendant judge is free
to raise his claims of vindictive or otherwise improper prosecu-
tion before the court; to date, courts have rejected all of the
allegations of improper prosecution that Judges Hastings, Clai-
borne, and Nixon have raised.20
III. THE TIUA
A. The Procedural Nightmare
The prosecution of a sitting judge in his own district causes
serious procedural problems. The problem begins with the basic
question of who should serve at the trial-judges, marshals,
clerks, and court reporters who have worked with the defendant?
This problem was exacerbated in the Claiborne and the Nixon
cases by the fact that both defendants were chief judges of small
districts with limited staffs available. First, the government's
- The defendant judges also have argued that the Constitution prohibits the
executive branch from prosecuting a sitting federal judge and that Congress alone can
punish a federal judge for high crimes and misdemeanors through the impeachment
process. Courts have not found this argument persuasive. See United States v. Claiborne,
727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
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response to this difficult predicament is to request the appellate
court to appoint an outside judge to preside at the trial. In the
three recent prosecutions, outstanding judges were given the
difficult assignment. 2' Next, the government seeks to assure itself
that the trial will not be compromised by the use of any court
personnel who will not be or may not be fair and impartial. In
some of the recent cases, this caused the Justice Department to
bring in outside marshals from around the country at great
expense to protect sequestered juries. Similarly, court reporters,
clerks, and bailiffs have come from outside the district (usually
with the assigned judge) to ensure a proper trial.
May a judge prepare the defense using the resources of his
or her chambers? If the defendant is still a judge, nothing
prevents him or her from working out of chambers except a
sense of propriety May the judge use his or her staff to help
prepare the defense? The law prohibits judicial resources, such
as a law clerk's time or photocopying, from being used on a
judge's personal business. Experience teaches that a judge's staff
will rally around him or her during a prosecution and seek to
help, particularly since an indicted judge will withdraw from
active cases or will be stripped of his or her docket, leaving the
staff with little to do. Of course, nothing prevents staff members
from volunteering their time to the judge after-hours or during
annual leave; the support from the staff may have been more
extensive than this during the recent prosecutions. While the
staff support of an indicted judge may be the subject of an
investigation one day, thus far the Justice Department has not
viewed this conduct as a serious problem.
B. Take Off the Robes
Undoubtedly, a federal judge is one of the most respected
figures in our society A primary goal of the Justice Department
during the trial of a federal judge is to get the jury to focus on
the conduct of the defendant and not on his status. The govern-
21 Judge Edward Thaxter Gignoux of the Distnct of Maine presided at the Hastings
trial. Judge Walter Hoffman of the Eastern District of Virgima presided at the Claiborne
trial. Judge James Meredith of the Eastern District of Missouri presided at the Nixon
trial.
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ment reminds the jury as often as possible that the judge should
be treated like all other defendants. Defense counsel typically
will try to convince the jury that a person of the judge's stature
is unlikely to commit the crimes charged. The verdict can turn
on which advocate is the more successful on this particular point.
An interesting issue would arise if a defendant judge insisted
on wearing his robes to court during his trial; however, this did
not occur during any of the three recent trials of federal judges.
Presumably, the trial court's inherent power to control the court-
room could result in an order to the defendant to disrobe if the
trial court found the robe sufficiently distracting or prejudicial
to the government.
Another interesting issue is how the defendant is to be ad-
dressed at trial. "Your Honor" certainly seems inappropriate.
If the defendant is still a judge during the trial, that he be
addressed as "Judge --- " seems natural; this was the govern-
ment's practice at the recent trials.
Nothing prevents the defendant judge from playing an active
role in his or her defense at trial. Indeed, Judge Hastings rep-
resented himself. Nevertheless, no matter what the defendant's
role is at -trial, the government will seek figuratively to take his
or her robes off and to keep the jury's attention directed to the
conduct for which he or she stands charged.
IV JuDICIAL DISABILITY ACT
Occasionally, the Justice Department will receive an allega-
tion of a federal judge's misconduct, investigate it, and then
conclude that the conduct is not criminal but that it is unethical
or inappropriate. At this point, the Department will make a
referral pursuant to the Judicial Disability Act of 1980 to the
appropriate circuit. Some may be concerned that the Depart-
ment's discretion in its referral decision is dangerous, arguing
that the Department will make referrals on judges it dislikes,
and not make referrals on judges it likes.
There are several answers to these concerns. First, the 1980
Act makes referrals discretionary, not mandatory 2 Second, the
- See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1982).
See id.
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judicial review mechanism would be completely overwhelmed if
every allegation received, irrespective of merit, required the ju-
diciary's response. Finally, the judiciary, not the Justice De-
partment, resolves any improper referrals by the government. I
know of no instance when the judiciary has concluded that any
referral made by the Justice Department was inappropriate.
The Department standard for referring judicial misconduct
is similar to the standard for referringo allegations of agency
employee misconduct to internal disciplinary units. During the
course of a criminal investigation, however, the Department does
not refer the judge to the judiciary pursuant to the 1980 Act or
refer the agency employee to the agency disciplinary unit. While
this policy may delay an adrmistrative remedy to a serious
problem, it ensures that the criminal investigation is not dis-
turbed.
V THE IMPEACHMENT PRocEss
The Justice Department obviously has no formal role in the
impeachment process of a federal judge. Usually, however, the
Department will have a substantial informational role because
the files of a government prosecutor or the FBI may contain the
evidence to support the impeachment. Congress expects the Justice
Department to cooperate completely with Congress during an
impeachment. Nevertheless, Congress has subpoena power and
can force the government to turn over evidence, even evidence
produced before a grand jury.24
A major legal issue that arose during the Claiborne impeach-
ment was whether the Senate could rely exclusively on the court
record to find an impeachable offense or whether it had to prove
the impeachable evidence in the Senate chamber. To my surprise,
the Senate chose the latter, and was burdened with a laborious
evidentiary hearing in which many of the same witnesses who
had testified at the criminal trial appeared. This approach raises
obvious questions. What if the Senate disagreed with the jury
14 The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary successfully
obtained an order to receive the record of the grand jury that indicted Judge Hastings.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), 669 F Supp. 1072
(S.D. Fla. 1987).
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and concluded that Judge Claiborne had not committed tax
evasion? Would Judge Claiborne have been permitted to resume
his seat on the bench after he served his two-year prison sen-
tence? Of course, a decision not to impeach would not have
reversed his conviction. I suggest that the Senate should rely on
the criminal trial court record to prove the offense, allow the
judge to rebut the record with live evidence if appropriate, and
then make the decision on whether the whole case amounts to
impeachable conduct. Otherwise, the Senate may face long, dif-
ficult impeachment trials that follow long, difficult jury trials.
Besides being tedious and time-consuming for Senators, serious
evidentiary problems inevitably will nag at the process; for ex-
ample, witnesses will die and memories will dim. Few tasks are
as difficult as a retrial, and having the Senate as venue for the
second proceeding makes retrial no easier. The Senate should
avoid this burden, particularly when a retrial does not make the
impeachment process any fairer.
CONCLUSION
The investigation and the prosecution of federal judges is a
difficult part of the job at the Department of Justice. Neverthe-
less, such investigations and prosecutions are necessary and im-
portant tasks that help to ensure the integrity of the federal
bench. The very great percentage of allegations of wrongdoing
by federal judges that the government receives are completely
meritless and easily disproven. The recent spate of prosecutions
of judges is not a cause for alarm and does not indicate a trend
toward increased judicial corruption. It means only that there
will be a few bad apples in any lot, no matter how outstanding
the majority, and that the Public Integrity Section of the Justice
Department is vigilant in ferretting out the bad ones.
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